The pure logic of discrimination

Louis Corriveau ()
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Louis Corriveau: Université de Moncton

Constitutional Political Economy, 2024, vol. 35, issue 4, No 2, 482-499

Abstract: Abstract The paper expounds a simple non-cooperative game, which can model discrimination in market and non-market transactions. The model has two equilibriums where individuals do not discriminate and several where they do. One non-discriminatory equilibrium dominates in the sense of Pareto all discriminatory equilibriums. The second non-discriminatory equilibrium is dominated by all other equilibriums. While there is no discrimination in the first-best outcome, the introduction of discrimination can thus be Pareto-improving in some circumstances. For instance, in the model, a move from an equilibrium where they face discrimination to another equilibrium where they discriminate too can sometimes make the members of a group better off, without making anyone else worse off. Another implication of the model is that interactions between officials of the state and ordinary citizens generate a greater number of potential patterns of discrimination than interactions between ordinary citizens.

Keywords: Discrimination; Market; Non-market; Social trap (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 J15 J71 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-023-09419-8

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