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The Italian Constitutional Court and recentralization along the pendulum of regionalism

Andrea Filippetti (), Sandro Rondinella () and Fabrizio Tuzi ()
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Andrea Filippetti: National Research Council
Sandro Rondinella: University of Calabria
Fabrizio Tuzi: National Research Council

Constitutional Political Economy, 2025, vol. 36, issue 1, No 6, 95-121

Abstract: Abstract This paper employs a quantitative analysis of the disputes between central and regional government concerning the role of the Italian Constitutional Court, focusing on the context of decentralization initiated during the late 1990s. The econometric evidence demonstrates a significant decrease in favourable outcomes for regional governments following the process of recentralization, which was commenced by central government in 2011 in response to a major financial crisis. The results of this study support the perspective of a centralistic attitude of the courts in litigation concerning subnational governments and provide fresh insights into the role of the courts in the relationship between recentralization and major economic crises.

Keywords: Constitutional court; Judicial behavior; Decentralization; Recentralization; Inter-government litigations; Italy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09445-0

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