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Are social contracts possible without actual negotiation?

Randall G. Holcombe and Gregory J. Robson ()
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Randall G. Holcombe: Florida State University
Gregory J. Robson: University of Notre Dame

Constitutional Political Economy, 2025, vol. 36, issue 1, No 4, 68-79

Abstract: Abstract This article addresses one of the several moral arguments for the state, the social contract argument, showing that this argument has been inadequately justified. The terms of any contract are determined by negotiation among the parties to the contract. The terms of any contract cannot be known absent actual negotiation to produce them. Social contract theorists widely believe that actual negotiation and actual agreement with a social contract did not occur, so their theories rest on hypothetical scenarios in which people would agree to the contract’s terms. Because actual negotiations did not produce a social contract, one cannot know its terms. This calls into question whether people could be obligated to abide by a social contract whose terms were not negotiated and hence are unknowable.

Keywords: Social contract; Role of government; Veil of ignorance; Consent; Constitutional economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09452-1

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