A political economy perspective of the constitution of ancient Sparta: conflict resolution, credibility, and stability

George Tridimas ()

Constitutional Political Economy, 2025, vol. 36, issue 1, No 3, 44-67

Abstract: Abstract Uniquely in Ancient Greece the constitution of Sparta provided for two kings from different dynasties reigning simultaneously, an aristocratic upper house, an annually elected board of overseers, an assembly, and a society of warriors to rule over an enslaved neighbouring population. It contributed to Sparta’s elevation to a great power and lasted almost unaltered for five hundred years until the middle of the third century BCE. The paper argues that the intricate constitutional order resolved internal conflicts about income distribution that had plagued Sparta in her early days. The dual kingship was a power sharing arrangement to avoid intra-elite fighting. Constraints on royal power, military organization and conquest of foreign lands secured redistribution to the Spartan poor solving inter-group conflict between the rich and the poor. The checks and balances provided by the constitution served to credibly commit the elite to the settlements. However, the rigidity of the constitution ossified Sparta’s society who could not respond to changing circumstances.

Keywords: Ancient Sparta; Constitution; Dual kingship; King-and-council; Income redistribution; Credibility; Stability; Rebellion; Conquest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 F51 N33 N93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09453-0

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