Federalism, political imbalance, and the right to secession
Bahar Leventoglu,
Georg Vanberg () and
Alessandra Waggoner
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Bahar Leventoglu: Duke University
Georg Vanberg: Duke University
Alessandra Waggoner: Duke University
Constitutional Political Economy, 2025, vol. 36, issue 1, No 2, 26-43
Abstract:
Abstract Scholars have generally taken a negative view of the inclusion of secession rights in federal constitutions. Adopting a constitutional political economy perspective, we challenge this consensus by highlighting the critical role that the right to secession can play in enforcing a federal bargain in the face of significant political imbalance among federal sub-units. We demonstrate that the inclusion of a secession right can allow for unanimous constitutional agreement to the formation of a federation in circumstances in which such agreement cannot be reached on a federation without a right to secession, even if union is potentially in the interests of all members.
Keywords: Federalism; Secession; Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:copoec:v:36:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s10602-025-09462-7
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-025-09462-7
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