Aggregation rules and institutional innovations for collective action

Todd Sandler and Weifeng Larry Liu ()
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Weifeng Larry Liu: Australian National University

Constitutional Political Economy, 2025, vol. 36, issue 1, No 1, 25 pages

Abstract: Abstract On the sixtieth anniversary Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action, the current study applies discrete game analysis to explore how key collective action aggregators affect the outcome of group behavior. Collective aggregators indicate how individual efforts determine the overall level of action achieved. In particular, the following aggregators—summation, arithmetic average, threshold, weakest link, and best shot—are examined regarding their Nash equilibriums for various group sizes. For some aggregators, greater group size exacerbates inefficiency, while for other aggregators, enhanced group size does not influence efficiency. A second purpose is to show how cost sharing may or may not improve efficiency for alternative collective aggregators. Lastly, partial cooperation is studied when component subgroups face different aggregators or cost-sharing arrangements. In keeping with Olson’s seminal study, institutional innovations including joint products are investigated as means for promoting collective action.

Keywords: Collective action aggregators and outcomes; Discrete games; Cost sharing; Institutional innovations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D70 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-025-09464-5

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