The nation-state foundations of constitutional compliance

Peter Grajzl (), Jerg Gutmann and Stefan Voigt ()
Additional contact information
Peter Grajzl: Washington and Lee University
Stefan Voigt: CESifo

Constitutional Political Economy, 2025, vol. 36, issue 3, No 3, 302-327

Abstract: Abstract We bring attention to a previously overlooked determinant of de jure-de facto constitutional gaps: a polity’s transition to a nation-state. We argue that nation-statehood, predicated on the formation of a strong sense of national identity, lowers the government’s incentive to violate constitutional provisions. To test our theory, we use a recently released longitudinal database on constitutional compliance and exploit variation in the timing of countries’ attainment of nation-statehood. Our empirical findings substantiate our hypothesis. Based on our preferred estimation approach, nation-statehood bolsters both overall constitutional compliance and constitutional compliance within the subdomains of basic rights, civil rights, and property rights & the rule of law. The estimated long-run effects of nation-statehood on constitutional compliance are considerable in size. Our analysis, thus, illuminates the foundational role of nation-statehood in fostering constitutional compliance.

Keywords: Constitutional compliance; De jure-de facto gap; Nation-state; National identity; Statehood (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D72 K10 K42 P51 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10602-023-09427-8 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: The Nation-State Foundations of Constitutional Compliance (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:copoec:v:36:y:2025:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-023-09427-8

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/10602/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10602-023-09427-8

Access Statistics for this article

Constitutional Political Economy is currently edited by Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

More articles in Constitutional Political Economy from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().