Political conflict, political polarization, and constitutional compliance

Jacek Lewkowicz (), Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska () and Jan Fałkowski ()
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Jacek Lewkowicz: University of Warsaw
Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska: University of Warsaw
Jan Fałkowski: University of Warsaw

Constitutional Political Economy, 2025, vol. 36, issue 3, No 5, 375 pages

Abstract: Abstract While the economic approach to constitutions highlights their contribution to resolving conflict, recent work on the de jure–de facto distinction in relation to various constitutional rules suggests that political conflict and polarization could play a role in explaining the size and evolution of the gap between constitution text and constitutional practice. In this paper, we are interested in the relationship between the degree of conflict in the political arena within the state, captured by the polarization of the political landscape, as well as the underlying political polarization in society, and compliance of government actors with the country’s constitution. Based on a number of theoretical arguments, we provide an empirical investigation for ca. 170 countries in the period 1975–2020, using the new Comparative Constitutional Compliance Database. Our results suggest that constitutional non-compliance is associated with more intense political polarization in society, but it does not seem to be correlated with polarization of the political landscape.

Keywords: Constitutional compliance; Political polarization; Political conflict; Constitutional economics; Constitutional political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 K19 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09434-3

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