International order and individual liberty

Friedrich Kratochwil

Constitutional Political Economy, 1992, vol. 3, issue 1, 29-50

Abstract: This article takes issue with the traditional way of conceptualizing international relations as anarchy. While the “anarchy problematique” has become established wisdom of neorealist (structuralist) international relations theory, neither the historical record, nor the analytical power, of this approach is borne out by closer examination. The elimination of questions concerning individual liberty, and the exclusion from analysis of international and domestic institutions serving this end, have been pursued in the vain hope of formulating a systematic and parsimonious theory of international politics. p ]On the basis of an examination of the post-war era, in which issues of stable democratic regimes and liberal international institutions were of primary importance, this article suggests an alternative approach for the study of international politics. By conceptualizing both the domestic and international systems associal systems, differing in degree and kind of institutionalized behavior, particular attention is directed to the link between individual rights and domestic institutions, as well as to the linkage of domestic and international structures. The metaphor of a “game,” constituted by rules and norms, is particularly helpful in providing an alternative research program. This approach is not only more attuned to political practice, it also allows for the stringent examination of normative questions. Copyright George Mason University 1992

Date: 1992
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DOI: 10.1007/BF02393231

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