How can constitutions be designed so that politicians who seek to serve “public interest” can survive and prosper?

James Buchanan

Constitutional Political Economy, 1993, vol. 4, issue 1, 6 pages

Abstract: Distributional politics in modern democracy involves the exploitation of minorities by majorities, and as persons rotate membership, all parties in the “game” lose. This result emerges only becausedifferences in treatment are permissible. If the principle ofgenerality (analogous to that present in an idealized version of the rule of law) could, somehow, be introduced into politics, mutual exploitation could be avoided. The analysis offers support for such policies as (1) flat-rate taxes, (2) equal per head transfers or demogrants and (3) uniform regulation of all industries. Copyright George Mason University 1993

Date: 1993
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DOI: 10.1007/BF02393280

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