Avoiding the mistreatment of bad risks in a democracy: Universal Health Insurance from a constitutional perspective

Mark Pauly

Constitutional Political Economy, 1994, vol. 5, issue 3, 307-318

Abstract: This paper examines the concept that social insurance for medical care may represent a kind of constitutional choice. The long-term stability of the U.S. Medicare program indicates that such programs are rarely altered. The primary reason postulated for treating subsidized medical insurance as a constitutional choice is to guard against a temporary majority of persons in good health or not at risk for a disease voting to deny benefits for the minority who are at higher risk. It is argued, however, that, although there needs to be constitutional status for social insurance, insurance need not and probably should not take the form of tax-financed equal coverage for all. Copyright George Mason University 1994

Keywords: H4; I10; I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/BF02393263

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