The economic constitution of the European community: From Rome to Maastricht

Manfred Streit and Werner Mussler

Constitutional Political Economy, 1994, vol. 5, issue 3, 319-353

Abstract: The present paper analyzes the changes in the economic constitution of the European Community since its foundation in 1958. In order to identify the various changes, we start by developing a frame of reference. Our proposition is that theconstitutional charter of the European Economic Community (EEC)—the EEC Treaty—came closest to this frame of reference, being an economic constitution for a market system, whereas the subsequentprocess of European integration—including several modifications of the Treaty—was largely based on the introduction of non-market elements. Our argument is that as far as the economic constitution is concerned, the Treaty of Maastricht is dominated by traits which are characteristic of modern welfare states. Copyright George Mason University 1994

Keywords: F02; L52; N44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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DOI: 10.1007/BF02393264

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