Economizing on virtue

Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin

Constitutional Political Economy, 1995, vol. 6, issue 1, 35-56

Abstract: Our central aim is to explore the ideas involved in the claim that certain institutional structures economize on virtue and, in particular, to explore the widely held idea that reliance on institutions that economize on virtue may undermine virtue itself. We explore these ideas both by discussing alternative conceptions of ‘virtue’ and ‘economizing’, and by constructing a simple model of the relationship between a specific institutional structure that may be said to economize on virtue and the emergence of virtue. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

Date: 1995
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DOI: 10.1007/BF01298375

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