Toward a theory of spontaneous law

Francesco Parisi

Constitutional Political Economy, 1995, vol. 6, issue 3, 231 pages

Abstract: Legal scholars have long recognized the significance of strategic behavior when considering how legal rules affect, individuals. In the principal applications of game theory to the law, legal rules have been analyzed as corrective devices for game inefficiencies. Law promotes what individuals cannot spontaneously achieve or helps them avoid the traps of strategic social interaction. The logic of this argument, however, needs to be reversed if one wishes to use game theory to explain the spontaneous emergence of law. The challenge is to apply the sophisticated tools of game theory to an appraisal of spontaneous sources of law and to consider the incentive structure of the originating environment as well as the possible role of strategic behavior in affecting the equilibrium outcome. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

Date: 1995
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF01303403 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:copoec:v:6:y:1995:i:3:p:211-231

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/10602/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/BF01303403

Access Statistics for this article

Constitutional Political Economy is currently edited by Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

More articles in Constitutional Political Economy from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().