Language orders

Richard Adelstein

Constitutional Political Economy, 1996, vol. 7, issue 3, 238 pages

Abstract: This essay examines the alternatives of spontaneous order and central planning in the context of human language to cast new light both on the issues raised in the Socialist Calculation debate of the 1930s and 40s and on the nature of language itself. The evolution of the complex systems of rules that comprise natural languages is discussed, and the process of language acquisition in children is used to illustrate the problems involved in characterizing any spontaneous order as a social contract or convention. Natural language orders are distinguished from explicit contracts through the concept of a “language trap,” in which an individual who voluntarily begins to participate in the order is gradually transformed by this participation and eventually becomes unable to leave it. A concluding section considers the implications of this trap and the pursuit of self-interest through language for attempts to construct and win adherents to artificial languages, and suggests the nature of the obstacles that confront any attempt to overcome or redirect the deeply rooted behaviors associated with spontaneous orders through the imposition of a central plan. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Keywords: A12; B41; P40; P51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00128163

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