A directly democratic and Federal Europe

Bruno Frey

Constitutional Political Economy, 1996, vol. 7, issue 4, 267-279

Abstract: This paper endeavors to take up the neglected aspects of federalism and direct democracy. It emphasizes the mutual dependence of the two for reaching the goals of efficiency and trust. Direct democracy is seen to preserve federalism, but even more importantly, federalism is taken to enable and to preserve effective direct democracy. Empirical evidence is adduced showing in particular that direct democracy leads to higher efficiency in the sense of lowering transaction costs. A proposal for a novel combination of federalism and direct democracy—which is called FOCJ (the acronym for “Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions”)—is suggested for Europe. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Keywords: D7; H1; H7; PO (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00119267

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