Faustian bargains

Vincent Ostrom

Constitutional Political Economy, 1996, vol. 7, issue 4, 303-308

Abstract: Frank Vibert's Europe: A Constitution for the Millennium (1995) demonstrates the state of the art in constitutional economics applied to Europe on the eve of a new millennium. This paper complements Vibert's analysis by pursuing issues that address the constitution of societies as systems of order rather than confining our attention to systems of government. An attempt is made to affirm Vibert's prescriptions from different intellectual foundations than those grounded in economic reasoning narrowly construed. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Keywords: D7; H1; Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/BF00119270

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