Vibert's European union: A United Nations or a United States?

Russell Sobel

Constitutional Political Economy, 1996, vol. 7, issue 4, 309-316

Abstract: In his book, Europe: A Constitution for the Millennium, Frank Vibert explores every major issue that will arise in the design of a constitution for a European political union. Can the theoretical constructs of constitutional economics be used to aid in the practical design of a European constitution? This is what Vibert attempts to do in his book. This review contains a more detailed discussion and analysis of a few of Vibert's main theses. In particular, it focuses, on several key issues that will be the major determinants of whether the European Union will achieve lasting success. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Keywords: H11; F02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00119271

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