Going, Going, Gone! A Swift Tour of Auction Theory and its Applications

Emiel Maasland and Sander Onderstal

De Economist, 2006, vol. 154, issue 2, 197-249

Keywords: auctioning incentive contracts; efficiency; equilibrium bidding; multiple objects; optimal auctions; revenue equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/s10645-006-9002-5

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