Do More Powerful Interest Groups Have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy?
Zara Sharif and
Otto H. Swank ()
Additional contact information
Zara Sharif: Erasmus University Rotterdam
Otto H. Swank: Erasmus University Rotterdam
De Economist, 2019, vol. 167, issue 2, 127-143
Abstract Decisions-makers often rely on information supplied by interested parties. In practice, some parties have easier access to information than other parties. In this light, we examine whether more powerful parties have a disproportionate influence on decisions. We show that more powerful parties influence decisions with higher probability when their stakes are sufficiently large. However, in expected terms, decisions do not depend on the relative strength of interested parties. When parties have not provided information, decisions are biased towards the less powerful parties. Finally, we show that compelling parties to supply information destroys incentives to collect information.
Keywords: Information collection; Communcation; Interest groups; Decision-making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 D82 H39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10645-019-09338-w Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:decono:v:167:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s10645-019-09338-w
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/10645/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
De Economist is currently edited by Rob Alessie, Bas ter Weel, Casper van Ewijk, Jan C. van Ours and Frank de Jong
More articles in De Economist from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().