Insider-Controlled Firms in Russia

Igor Filatotchev, Michael Bleaney and Mike Wright

Economic Change and Restructuring, 1999, vol. 32, issue 2, 129-51

Abstract: Privatisation Vouchers in Russia were heavily invested in the holders' own firms. Using data from a recent survey, we show that insider control in firms privatised in 1992-4 through the voucher process (as distinct from the earlier leased buy-out method) is insecure and dependent on managers' support. For employees, investment in insider control appears to have been motivated by employment income insurance rather than expected excess returns on the equity. Managers are predominantly the same individuals as before privatisation and display considerable hostility to outside investors, probably because they fear dismissal should outsiders gain control. Despite insider control, firms are shedding labour quite rapidly through voluntary resignations. Employment dynamics appear to be unrelated to insider equity ownership. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1999
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