How does anti-corruption policy affect the sensitivity of green innovation to executive incentives?
Xu Wang,
Xu Chu and
Chien-Chiang Lee ()
Additional contact information
Xu Wang: Shandong University of Finance and Economics
Xu Chu: Xiamen University
Economic Change and Restructuring, 2023, vol. 56, issue 1, No 4, 79-109
Abstract:
Abstract Due to the unique contribution it makes to both environmental and financial performances, green innovation has become a key factor driving organizations to achieve sustainable development. Policy change presents a good opportunity to discover the drivers of corporate behavior. Considering the way in which anti-corruption policy can affect firms’ innovation environment and innovation decisions, this research takes China’s anti-corruption policy as a shock condition and conducts a quasi-experiment to discuss the impact of anti-corruption policy on the sensitivity of green innovation to executive incentives in China. The main findings reveal that anti-corruption policy significantly improves the sensitivity of green innovation to equity incentives and decreases the sensitivity to control rights incentives, but does not influence the sensitivity to reputation incentives. These findings show the integrated impact of an exogenous environment and endogenous governance upon green innovation. We also reveal the difference of this integrated impact in the context of various natures of ownership. Specifically, in private enterprises, anti-corruption policy can optimize the sensitivity of green innovation to equity incentives, while in state-owned enterprises the sensitivity of green innovation to reputation incentives combined with equity incentives or with control rights incentives significantly improves. The findings presented in this paper reveal the micro-economic effects of anti-corruption policy on green innovation and instruct firms to optimize executive incentive arrangements to green development under the background of China’s anti-corruption campaign.
Keywords: Green innovation; Anti-corruption policy; Executive incentives; “Innovation-incentive” sensitivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10644-022-09413-4 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:ecopln:v:56:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s10644-022-09413-4
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... nt/journal/10644/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/s10644-022-09413-4
Access Statistics for this article
Economic Change and Restructuring is currently edited by George Hondroyiannis
More articles in Economic Change and Restructuring from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().