Incomplete Contracts, Intellectual Property and Institutional Complementarities
Ugo Pagano and
Maria Rossi (alessandra.rossi@unisi.it)
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2004, vol. 18, issue 1, 55-76
Keywords: intellectual property; incomplete contracts; incentives; efficient allocation; institutional complementarity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1023/B:EJLE.0000032770.51219.4d
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