Efficient compensation for employees' inventions
Roland Kirstein and
Birgit Will ()
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2006, vol. 21, issue 2, 129-148
Keywords: Moral hazard; Hold-up; Efficient fixed wage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Working Paper: Efficient Compensation for Employees? Inventions (2003)
Working Paper: Efficient Compensation for Employees’ Inventions
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:21:y:2006:i:2:p:129-148
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
European Journal of Law and Economics is currently edited by Jürgen Georg Backhaus, Giovanni B. Ramello and Alain Marciano
More articles in European Journal of Law and Economics from Springer
Series data maintained by Sonal Shukla ().