 Race, politics, and punishmentPeter Leeson and Russell Sobel European Journal of Law and Economics, 2011, vol. 31, issue 3, No 3, 265-285 Abstract: Abstract This paper empirically evaluates two competing theories of electoral accountability in the context of New Orleans’ 2006 mayoral election. According to the democratic efficiency theory, voters can successfully punish ineffective political agents by removing them from office. In contrast, the public choice theory argues that the bundled nature of political goods prevents voters from successfully holding ineffective politicians accountable. We find that although there is limited support for the punishment effect predicted by the democratic efficiency theory, this effect is overwhelmed by the fact that the bundle of goods politicians offer contains elements that pull in opposing directions. This prevents the punishment effect from having any real impact, leading to democratic failure. Our results support the public choice theory of electoral (un)accountability. Keywords: Democratic failure; Hurricane Katrina; New Orleans (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:31:y:2011:i:3:d:10.1007_s10657-011-9228-9 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/s10657-011-9228-9 Access Statistics for this article European Journal of Law and Economics is currently edited by Jürgen Georg Backhaus, Giovanni B. Ramello and Alain Marciano More articles in European Journal of Law and Economics from Springer |
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