Predation enforcement options: an evaluation in a Cournot framework

Kai Hüschelrath () and Jürgen Weigand ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kai Hueschelrath

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2013, vol. 35, issue 2, 272 pages

Abstract: The paper characterises the building blocks of a framework to enforce anti-predation rules and subsequently evaluates selected enforcement options in a Cournot-type duopoly predation model. Differentiating between a no rule approach, an ex ante approach and two ex post approaches, it is shown that an ex post approach typically maximises overall welfare. However, an ex ante approach can be the preferred option in cases where the entrant has a large cost advantage over the incumbent. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Keywords: Competition policy; Monopolisation; Predation; Enforcement; K21; L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-011-9227-x

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