A microeconomic model of the demand of civil justice: is one institutional context better than another?
Maria Antonelli () and
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2013, vol. 36, issue 2, 295-318
The paper analyzes how institutional elements affect the decision to file of risk neutral agents. In particular, we introduce an objective probability of winning given by the combination of a precedent-weight parameter (defining the type of legal system) and a transparency factor. 603,000 simulated trials, shaped upon our model, reveal two main findings: (1) the transparency level matters in terms of inefficient decisions; (2) a precedent driven system is not necessarily more efficient. Hence, policy makers should invest in increasing the level of information among courts and between courts and the parties both in civil and common law systems. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
Keywords: Judicial precedent; Transparency of the legal systems; Decision to file; Comparative efficiency of legal systems; K40; K41; H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:36:y:2013:i:2:p:295-318
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
European Journal of Law and Economics is currently edited by Jürgen Georg Backhaus, Giovanni B. Ramello and Alain Marciano
More articles in European Journal of Law and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().