Merger settlement as a screening device

Juwon Kwak ()

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2013, vol. 36, issue 3, 523-540

Abstract: This article presents an economic model of judicial settlement in an asymmetric information setting to analyze the merger settlement between merging firms and a competition authority. The model analyzes how the competition authority may use the settlement process to screen out efficient mergers from inefficient ones. Because of the self-selection among merging firms, efficient mergers may be litigated in court, whereas inefficient mergers may be settled before going to trial. We further analyze the role and the effect of the second request in a merger settlement. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Keywords: Merger settlement; Hart–Scott–Rodino Act; Merger Regulation 4064/89; Second request; L41; K21; K41; K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10657-012-9330-7 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:36:y:2013:i:3:p:523-540

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10657

DOI: 10.1007/s10657-012-9330-7

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Law and Economics is currently edited by Jürgen Georg Backhaus, Giovanni B. Ramello and Alain Marciano

More articles in European Journal of Law and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().