The regulatory anticommons of green infrastructures

Giuseppe Bellantuono ()

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2014, vol. 37, issue 2, 325-354

Abstract: Development of green infrastructures (renewable energy plants and transmission networks) is urgently needed if significant reductions of greenhouse gas emissions are to be accomplished in the next few decades. But the huge financial investments required by these infrastructures will not be undertaken without a well-designed regulatory framework. This paper argues that barriers to the implementation of such a framework can best be understood by drawing analogies to the Law and Economics literature on anticommons. Although situations of ownership anticommons (many owners with veto rights) and regulatory anticommons (many regulators with veto rights) display some differences from the point of view of the preferences and the coordination costs, it is submitted that this analytic framework can be employed to assess and criticize recent EU and US proposals which try to improve planning and siting procedures for cross-border green infrastructures. The literature on anticommons also suggests that effective remedies to suboptimal resource use are directly dependent on the design of the coordination mechanisms among all the regulatory levels. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2014

Keywords: Infrastructure regulation; Climate change; Renewable energy; Anticommons; K11; K23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10657-012-9298-3 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:37:y:2014:i:2:p:325-354

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10657

DOI: 10.1007/s10657-012-9298-3

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Law and Economics is currently edited by Jürgen Georg Backhaus, Giovanni B. Ramello and Alain Marciano

More articles in European Journal of Law and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().