Analyzing preliminary references as the powerbase of the European Court of Justice

Lars Hornuf () and Stefan Voigt

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2015, vol. 39, issue 2, 287-311

Abstract: The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is a very powerful court compared to other international courts and even national courts of last resort. Observers almost unanimously agree that it is the preliminary references procedure that made the ECJ the powerful court it is today. In this article, we analyze the factors that lead national courts to use the procedure. We add to previous studies by constructing a comprehensive panel dataset (1982–2008) and identify the economic structure, familiarity with EU law, and tenure of democracy as new determinants. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: European Court of Justice; Court behavior; Preliminary reference procedure; H77; K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10657-014-9449-9 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:39:y:2015:i:2:p:287-311

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10657

DOI: 10.1007/s10657-014-9449-9

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Law and Economics is currently edited by Jürgen Georg Backhaus, Giovanni B. Ramello and Alain Marciano

More articles in European Journal of Law and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().