Judicial efficiency and entrepreneurs’ expectations on the reliability of European legal systems
Alessandro Melcarne () and
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2015, vol. 40, issue 1, 75-94
Many theories have tried to discover the determinants of entrepreneurship while at the same time defining a policy contour for its promotion. This study advances the extant discussion by focusing on the specific relationship between national judiciaries’ performances and expectations about the reliability of the legal framework, which is an important component fostering entrepreneurial action. More precisely, by conducting an empirical investigation on a number of European countries, it assesses the role that judicial efficiency plays in reducing endogenous uncertainty in markets. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015
Keywords: Judicial efficiency; Courts performance; Enforcing contract; Entrepreneurship; Clearance rate; DEA; K41; L26; C14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Working Paper: Judicial Efficiency and Entrepreneurs’ Expectations on the Reliability of European Legal Systems (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:40:y:2015:i:1:p:75-94
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
European Journal of Law and Economics is currently edited by Jürgen Georg Backhaus, Giovanni B. Ramello and Alain Marciano
More articles in European Journal of Law and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().