Patent litigation settlement in Germany: why parties settle during trial

Katrin Cremers () and Paula Schliessler

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2015, vol. 40, issue 2, 185-208

Abstract: This paper looks at the decision to settle patent litigation in Germany by focusing on detailed data on within-trial actions and motivations by plaintiff, defendant and the courts. Using a new dataset covering about 80 % of all patent litigation cases in Germany between 2000 and 2008 we estimate the likelihood of within-trial settlement. We find that the within-trial settlement decision is to some degree driven by the proceedings that change the pre-trial setting of the negotiations in terms of information and stakes and make previously refused settlement a new option. Additionally, firm-specific stakes as measured by the relation of the involved parties to the disputed patent as well as firm-specific strategies are found to affect the general willingness to settle after the filing of a court case. The results suggest that pre-trial failure of settlement negotiations can to some extent be offset by within-trial settlement through efforts made by the court, but that the disposition to settle is to a larger degree determined by firm-specific stakes and strategies in the case. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Patent; Patent litigation; Settlement; O34; K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Working Paper: Patent litigation settlement in Germany: Why parties settle during trial (2012)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-014-9472-x

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