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On compensation schemes for data sharing within the European REACH legislation

Sylvain Béal and Marc Deschamps

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2016, vol. 41, issue 1, 157-181

Abstract: Article 30 of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 concerns the sharing of data between users of a chemical substance. We study this bargaining problem by means of a special class of games in coalitional form called data games (Dehez and Tellone in J Public Econ Theory 15:654–673, 2013 ). For such problems, compensation schemes specify how the data owners should be compensated by the agents in needs of data. On the class of data games, the Core, the Nucleolus and the Shapley value provide relevant compensation schemes. We provide four comparable axiomatic characterizations of the set of all (additive) compensation schemes belonging to the Core, of the Nucleolus, of the Shapley value and of the Full compensation mechanism, a compensation scheme exclusively designed for data sharing problems. The axioms reflects principles of various theories of justice. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Keywords: REACH; Data sharing problem; Core; Nucleolus; Shapley value; Full compensation mechanism; Axiomatic study; C71; D71; K32; L65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: On compensation schemes for data sharing within the European REACH legislation (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: On compensation schemes for data sharing within the european REACH legislation (2014) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-014-9468-6

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