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Inside or outside control of banks? Evidence from the composition of supervisory boards

Kathrin Johansen (), Saskia Laser (), Doris Neuberger () and Ettore Andreani ()
Additional contact information
Kathrin Johansen: University of Rostock
Saskia Laser: University of Rostock
Ettore Andreani: UniCredit S.p.A.

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2017, vol. 43, issue 1, No 2, 58 pages

Abstract: Abstract This paper examines the composition of supervisory boards of 41 large German banks in 1999–2010. We find that the supervisory board structure reflects both outside control by major shareholders and inside control by other stakeholders. The largest group among non-employee board members is made up of bank managers. The high proportion of former executives and German board representation indicates significant inside control. The chairpersons of banks controlled by banks are less likely to be former executives of the same bank than are the chairpersons of banks controlled by non-banks. Over time, representation of industrial and insurance companies on banks’ supervisory boards has decreased and the representation of banks and foreign shareholders has increased.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Dual board system; Principal agent theory; Stakeholder theory; Banks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G34 K22 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-014-9463-y

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