Domestic judicial defiance and the authority of international legal regimes

Arthur Dyevre ()
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Arthur Dyevre: KU Leuven

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2017, vol. 44, issue 3, No 3, 453-481

Abstract: Abstract Tensions and occasional overt defiance of international courts suggest that compliance with international regimes is not a self-evident choice for domestic judges. I develop a formal theory of domestic judicial defiance in which domestic and supranational judges vie for jurisprudential authority in a non-hierarchical setting. The model emphasises the role of domestic non-compliance costs and power asymmetries in determining the conduct of domestic and international judges. I argue that the EU represents a special case of a particularly effective international regime. Weak domestic courts have little to gain from an escalated conflict with the European court of Justice. But even domestic judicial superpowers like the German Federal Constitutional Court have strong incentives to seek mutual accommodation with European judges. The analysis also yields new insights into concepts, such as “judicial dialogue” and “constitutional pluralism” that have featured prominently in the legal literature, and suggests new hypotheses for empirical research.

Keywords: International law; Domestic courts; Defiance; Judicial behaviour; Non-hierarchical setting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-016-9551-2

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