Optimal enforcement of competition policy: the commitments procedure under uncertainty
Axel Gautier () and
Nicolas Petit ()
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Nicolas Petit: University of Liege
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2018, vol. 45, issue 2, No 1, 195-224
Abstract The introduction of a commitments procedure in EU antitrust policy (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003) has entitled the the European Commission to extensively settle cases of alleged anticompetitive conduct. In this paper, we use a formal model of law enforcement to identify the optimal procedure to remedy cases in a context of partial legal uncertainty (Katsoulacos and Ulph in Eur J Law Econ 41(2):255–282, 2016). We discuss in particular the merits of a policy of selective commitments where firms either take strong commitments or are investigated under the standard infringement procedure.
Keywords: Competition policy; European Commission; Commitments; Law enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K41 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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