Resisting the extortion racket: an empirical analysis

Michele Battisti, Andrea Lavezzi, Lucio Masserini () and Monica Pratesi ()
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Lucio Masserini: University of Pisa
Monica Pratesi: University of Pisa

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2018, vol. 46, issue 1, No 1, 37 pages

Abstract: Abstract While the contributions on the organized crime and Mafia environments are many, there is a lack of empirical evidence on the firm’s decision to resist to extortion. Our case study is based on Addiopizzo, an NGO that, from 2004, invites firms to refuse requests from the local Mafia and to join a public list of “non-payers”. The research is based on a dataset obtained linking the current administrative archives maintained by the chambers of commerce and the list updated by the NGO. The objective of this paper is twofold: first, to gather sound data on the characteristics of the Addiopizzo joiners; second to model the probability to join Addiopizzo by a two-level logistic regression model. We find that the resilience behavior is likely to be the result of both individual (firm) and environmental factors. In particular, we find that firm’s total assets, firm’s age and being in the construction sector are negatively correlated with the probability of joining AP, while a higher level of human capital embodied in the firm and a higher number of employees are positively correlated. Among the district-level variables, we find that the share of district’s population is negatively correlated with the probability to join, while a higher level of socio-economic development, including education levels, are positively correlated.

Keywords: Organized crime; Extortion; Social mobilization; Multilevel regression models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C41 K42 O17 R11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Resisting the Extortion Racket: an Empirical Analysis (2015)
Working Paper: Resisting to the Extortion Racket: an Empirical Analysis (2014)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-018-9589-4

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