Consensus and dissent in the resolution of conflicts of competence by the Spanish Constitutional Court: the role of federalism and ideology

Julio López-Laborda, Fernando Rodrigo () and Eduardo Sanz-Arcega ()
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Fernando Rodrigo: University of Zaragoza
Eduardo Sanz-Arcega: University of Zaragoza

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2019, vol. 48, issue 3, No 1, 305-330

Abstract: Abstract Given the lack of unambiguously constitutional foundations, Spain’s Constitutional Court (TC) has being playing a leading role in building the regulatory framework of the Autonomic State. This paper analyses whether this function is sufficient to explain the level of agreement among TC justices when adopting their resolutions, and in particular, on reaching unanimous rulings. If so, the legalist/federalist model would be a more adequate model to explain the behaviour of TC justices than the other models proposed in the literature on judicial behaviour: the attitudinal and the strategic models. A database has been constructed for this purpose with the 390 positive conflicts of competence between the central government and the autonomous communities resolved by the TC from 1981 to 2017, which have been used to estimate various explanatory models of unanimous rulings. The results obtained show the importance of the legalist/federalist model when attempting to explain unanimity in the Court’s pronouncements, but they also offer evidence that there are other factors that also influence the level of agreement among TC justices, remarkably the ideological ones.

Keywords: Constitutional Court; Conflicts of competence; Unanimity; Federalism; Ideology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-019-09631-8

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