Securing personal freedom through institutions: the role of electoral democracy and judicial independence
Niclas Berggren () and
Jerg Gutmann ()
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2020, vol. 49, issue 2, No 1, 165-186
Abstract We investigate empirically how electoral democracy and judicial independence relate to personal freedom. While judicial independence is positively and robustly related to personal freedom in all its forms, electoral democracy displays a robust, positive relationship with only two out of seven types of personal freedom (freedom of association, assembly and civil society; freedom of expression and information). Interaction terms and more refined indicators of the political system reveal that countries without elections or with only one political party benefit more from judicial independence than both democracies and multi-party systems without free elections.
Keywords: Freedom; Democracy; Judicial independence; Political economy; Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D72 D78 K36 K38 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Securing Personal Freedom through Institutions – the Role of Electoral Democracy and Judicial Independence (2019)
Working Paper: Securing personal freedom through institutions – the role of electoral democracy and judicial independence (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:49:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s10657-020-09643-9
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