EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Transparency, asymmetric information and cooperation

Gianna Lotito, Matteo Migheli () and Guido Ortona
Additional contact information
Matteo Migheli: Università di Torino
Guido Ortona: DiGSPES, Università del Piemonte Orientale

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2020, vol. 50, issue 2, No 4, 267-294

Abstract: Abstract We inquire experimentally whether asymmetric information in competitive settings and competition per se influence individual social behaviour. Participants perform a task and are remunerated according to two schemes, a non-competitive and a competitive one, then they play a standard public goods game. In the first scheme participants earn a flat remuneration, in the other they are ranked according to their performance and remunerated accordingly. Information about ranking and income before the game is played varies across three different treatments. We find that competition per se does not affect the amount of contribution. The time spent to choose how much to contribute is negatively correlated with the decision of cooperating fully. The main result is that full information about the relative performance in the competitive environment enhances the cooperation, while partial information reduces it.

Keywords: Incomplete contracts; Asymmetric information; Competition; Cooperation; Public goods; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D80 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10657-020-09669-z Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:50:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s10657-020-09669-z

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10657

DOI: 10.1007/s10657-020-09669-z

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Law and Economics is currently edited by Jürgen Georg Backhaus, Giovanni B. Ramello and Alain Marciano

More articles in European Journal of Law and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2021-03-28
Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:50:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s10657-020-09669-z