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Avoiding silent opera: the ‘grand’ performing right at work in nineteenth century Paris

Staffan Albinsson ()
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Staffan Albinsson: University of Gothenburg

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2021, vol. 51, issue 1, No 6, 183-200

Abstract: Abstract The music industry has been made possible through performing rights based on a law introduced by the post-revolutionary French national assembly in 1791. However, it took until the mid-nineteenth century until a system of royalty collection was established in France (and another half a century or more in other countries). In France, this new system for non-dramatic performing rights was preceded by royalty regulations in theatres. This study describes how nineteenth century composers were compensated for their work in the Paris Opera through this performing right for drama, known as the ‘grand right’. The tariff-based compensation method had been put in place by a royal réglement in 1713. It created a classic winner-take-all phenomenon in which composers such as Auber, Meyerbeer, and Halévy thrived in the nineteenth century. A contributing fact was the opera house programming which, contrary to the programming of today, favoured new pieces. ‘Grand opéras’ were à la mode and they contributed to the financial success of their composers. However, these operas eventually lost their attraction. In 1884, the Paris Opera adopted a compensation system based on a percentage of box office revenues. The study is based on primary data for 1810–1866.

Keywords: Copyright; Cultural economics; Opera; Composers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 J31 N83 Z19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-020-09677-z

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