In practice or just on paper? Some insights on using alphabetical rule to assign judges to cases

Jan Fałkowski () and Jacek Lewkowicz
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Jan Fałkowski: University of Warsaw

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2022, vol. 54, issue 3, No 3, 405-430

Abstract: Abstract In order to prevent judicial bias and increase transparency within the court system, case distribution among judges is often subjected to specific rules. The question which arises, however, is whether these rules are obeyed in practice. In this paper, looking at the example from the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland in the period 2011–2014, we check whether assigning judges to panels is consistent with the alphabetical rule that should govern the appointment of judges to cases. Our results show that the rule was fully obeyed only rarely and in fact, in most cases, it was notably disrupted. We test several potential explanations that may account for this issue. We find that the most obvious explanations such as formal preclusions, random events or other duties at the Tribunal can account for a minor share of the violations at best. Among the factors that we considered, a strategic composition of adjudication panels appears to have the highest explanatory potential.

Keywords: Judicial independence; Constitutional court; Law & economics; Institutional economics; s: B52; D02; D85; K40; P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-022-09733-w

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