Plea bargaining and investigation effort: inquisitorial criminal procedure as a three-player game

Robin Christmann ()
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Robin Christmann: University of Applied Sciences

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2023, vol. 56, issue 3, No 5, 497-532

Abstract: Abstract This paper contributes to the question whether plea bargaining is compatible with the inquisitorial tradition. We stylize inquisitorial criminal procedure as a sequential game with two impartial investigators, judge and prosecutor. Both agents are subject to private investigation costs and seek a correct decision over a defendant of uncertain guilt. Our analysis shows that the introduction of plea deals in courtroom helps to overcome the problem of effort coordination between the two agents. Moreover, we demonstrate that the introduction of plea deals reduces the number of wrongful convictions, but this comes at the cost of some guilty defendants getting away unpunished. Our results are robust to small decision errors by the players and attorney moral hazard. We further consider the implications of imperfect verification skills by judges, different timing of deals, or prosecutors who just seek to maximize convictions and guilty pleas.

Keywords: Screening; Free-riding; Litigation; Court errors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 K14 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-023-09782-9

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