The deterrence effect of criminal sanctions against environmental crime in Finland: an application of the rational choice model of crime
Riku Lindqvist (),
Chiara Lombardini (),
Leila Suvantola and
Markku Ollikainen ()
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Riku Lindqvist: University of Helsinki
Chiara Lombardini: University of Helsinki
Markku Ollikainen: University of Helsinki
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2024, vol. 58, issue 2, No 1, 175-200
Abstract:
Abstract Applying the rational choice model of crime, this study estimates the optimality of sanctions for environmental crimes, the social cost of these crimes and the expected gain to the offender with Finnish court data from 327 criminal cases in the period 2013–2018. Sensitivity analyses are conducted for the optimal fine, the expected gain from the crime and its social cost. The time-lag and uncertainties related to the restoration of the environmental harm are explicitly included in the model and the empirical analysis. The average fine was much lower than the optimal fine even when taking into account the constraint posed by the offenders’ wealth and disregarding the time-lag and uncertainties related to the restoration of the environmental harm. The use of prison sentences was also suboptimal. Even when the illegal gain was fully forfeited, the expected gain from the crime to the offender remained positive. Our results suggest a need to increase the cost of punishment by higher fines and reliable forfeiture of the illegal economic gain. They also point to the importance of systematically estimating both the environmental damage and the illegal gain from the crime as these were available respectively for only 24% (N = 79) and 3% (N = 11) of all cases.
Keywords: Deterrence effect; Environmental crime; Finland; Law and economics; Optimal fine; Rational choice model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:58:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s10657-024-09818-8
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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-024-09818-8
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