Forerunners vs. latecomers—institutional competition in the German federalism during the COVID crisis

Lukas Breide (), Oliver Budzinski, Thomas Grebel () and Juliane Mendelsohn ()
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Lukas Breide: Ilmenau University of Technology
Thomas Grebel: Ilmenau University of Technology
Juliane Mendelsohn: Ilmenau University of Technology

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2025, vol. 59, issue 1, No 4, 132 pages

Abstract: Abstract During the COVID-19 pandemic, political competition among the premiers of Germany’s 16 federal states intensified, with leaders striving to position themselves as proactive forerunners in managing the crisis. This paper examines the timing and determination of these state leaders in announcing, legislating, and enforcing COVID-19 policies, with attention to regional contexts and specific determinants influencing their actions. Utilizing multiple distinct databases, we conduct a survival analysis to assess each state’s political response in relative terms. Our findings reveal that state leaders who were early advocates in public announcements and discourse did not necessarily lead in formal legislation or enforcement of COVID-19 measures. This study provides a nuanced view of political competition in crisis governance, highlighting the divergence between political rhetoric and tangible policy action across Germany’s federal landscape.

Keywords: Political competition; Institutions; COVID; Survival analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H11 H12 H7 R5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Working Paper: Forerunners vs. latecomers: Institutional competition in the German federalism during the COVID crisis (2023)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-025-09832-4

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