Firms’ legality and efficiency: evidence from public procurement

Elisabetta Iossa () and Chiara Latour ()
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Elisabetta Iossa: Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato
Chiara Latour: University of Stockholm

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2025, vol. 59, issue 3, No 2, 439-455

Abstract: Abstract Do firms with higher legality standards contribute to better procurement outcomes? We address this question in the context of Italian public works procurement, by combining contract-level data on procurement and firm-level data on legality scores, using the Legality Rating System managed by the Italian Antitrust Authority. We find that higher legality scores are positively associated with a significant and economically important improvement in procurement efficiency, measured by shorter time delays and lower extra costs.

Keywords: Cartels; Corruption; Firm efficiency; Legality; Procurement; H57; K40; L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-025-09848-w

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