Can the ECB be Truly Independent? Should It Be?
Andrew Hughes Hallett () and
Nicola Viegi ()
Empirica, 1999, vol. 26, issue 3, 217-240
Keywords: Asymmetries; cooperation; fiscal-monetary interactions; incentives for independence; monetary union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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