Bidders' and Sellers' Strategies in Sequential Auctions. New Evidence about the Afternoon Effect
Lucio Picci and
Antonello Scorcu ()
Empirica, 2003, vol. 30, issue 2, 163-178
Keywords: Panel data; dynamic specification; heterogeneity; sequential auctions; price decline puzzle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:empiri:v:30:y:2003:i:2:p:163-178
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ration/journal/10663
Access Statistics for this article
Empirica is currently edited by Fritz Breuss and Fritz Breuss
More articles in Empirica from Springer, Austrian Institute for Economic Research, Austrian Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().