Defying the ‘Juncker curse’: can reformist governments be re-elected?

Marco Buti, Alessandro Turrini, Paul Van den Noord and Pietro Biroli (pietrobiroli@gmail.com)

Empirica, 2009, vol. 36, issue 1, 65-100

Keywords: Economic and Monetary Union; Structural reforms; Electoral cycle; Financial markets; E61; H30; H60; H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Working Paper: Defying the 'Juncker Curse?: Can Reformist Governments Be Re-elected? (2008)
Working Paper: Defying the 'Juncker Curse': Can Reformist Governments Be Re-elected? (2008)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10663-008-9093-0

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