“Haircuts” for the EMU periphery: virtue or vice?

Reinhard Neck () and Dmitri Blueschke

Empirica, 2014, vol. 41, issue 2, 153-175

Abstract: We use a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study the impacts of an exogenous fall in aggregate demand, the resulting increase in public debt, and the consequences of a sovereign debt haircut for a member country or bloc of the union. Two different scenarios for such a haircut are assumed: an expected and an unexpected haircut. In the union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies whereas the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a “core” with lower initial public debt, and a “periphery” with higher initial public debt. The “periphery’’ may experience the haircut due to the high level of its sovereign debt. We calculate numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that a haircut as modeled in our study is disadvantageous for both the “core” and the “periphery” of the monetary union, both when expected and when unexpected. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Monetary union; Asymmetric union; Dynamic game; Numerical solutions; Nash equilibrium; Pareto solution; Fiscal policy; Monetary policy; Policy cooperation; E6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: "Haircuts" for the EMU Periphery: Virtue or Vice? (2013)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10663-014-9252-4

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